Three more cases of CWD found in wild deer ALBERTA

[Sandhusker]

[Texan]

[Bill]

[Big Muddy rancher]

R-CALF doexn't have a "Protectionist"agaenda. Gee Sandhusker you really made me laugh this morning.

[Texan]

[Hanta Yo]

[Oldtimer]

[Sandhusker]

[mwj]

[flounder]

hello there Texan,


yep, you read it right. don't know what ya'll gonna do without me. you know i plan on retiring from this mess soon. the pay is simply too excessive ;-( i fed them all i had at the time, and they shot the teacher. then hired old stanley i heard, go figure, must have been all those PhDs i had ;-)


as with the fuji-tv, when they came here and interviewed me for a BSE show, that i don't know what happened too, or the madcowboy documentary i was asked to proofread, and did, assured i would get some credit for, to never hear from again, to the speech in south Korea i was to make Nov. 23, but was shipwrecked somehow there too, and that might have been a good thing considering all the riots, and they did get the information anyway, to the TSS documentary, that too fell apart for good reasons i suppose, to helping creekstone, and finally to the NIH attempted destruction of an historical bank of donated tissue from CJD victims, and that one i think i did manage to stop, and that thanks to a Republican John Cornyn, i simply think it's time to let you fellars and gals clear this mess up. i have wasted enough time. it will be a decade next Christmas. i just would hate to keep kicking the same old mad cow. i know what happened for the most part, and the ones that don't get it now, never will.


now there Texan, as far as your question, and confusion ;-) i bet you thought i was not going to answer it, or, maybe hoping i would ;



flounder wrote:
This is what sank my battleship in regards to testifying for r-calf. they actually appoached me about it, but i told them i would be glad to testify, but i was not stopping at the Canadian border, my testimony was to come south as well if given the opportunity. and that ended that, but i did supply them with a load of data, for whatever that was worth.



I highlighted the parts that confuse me. This almost makes it seem as if R-CALF was asking you to testify for them, but changed their mind when they found out that you were going to tell the WHOLE truth, instead of just the truth as regards Canadian imports.

I thought that R-CALF was only interested in the WHOLE truth - not just the selected parts of the truth that fit their protectionist agenda? After reading your post, it makes a person wonder. Maybe I read it wrong...

Am I reading this correctly, Terry? That can't be right, can it? Thanks.

=========================================================


hello again there Texan,


i don't guess it matters anymore, i don't think ill be testifying for anyone, unless it is my own execution.

i was willing to participate in good faith, and sound science, that is why i think i was never sent to testify,

because in my opinion, R-Calf only wanted to cherry-pick the science, to use to there advantage, to try and

claim that Canada had a worse BSE problem than the USA, and i could not conceed to that. the science did

not confirm this. all one has to do is read the BSE GBR risk assessments, and that is why GW/OIE et al revised

there own risk assessments ;-) the BSE MRR policy.

i don't know, maybe i misinterpreted it all, maybe not, you can be the judge ;




-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Your posts to me this week /3rd week of Feb to date
Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2005 23:25:26 -0800 (PST)
From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>



Dear Terry:

Well, I am a humbled man...and damn proud of it.
You've already provided us, in the span of a few days,so much important and relevant information, that isnot arguable.Great internet research, Terry. Really, reallygreat.Whether you realize it or not....it's already had animpact....Check.....http://www.usagnet.com About the EU's newBSE tests. Look at the lag time it took from thedate you sent that information to us! And that'sbecause we aren't sending that directly....which Ipersonally believe is the proper way for this topass....because others need to be aware of this whoare setting policies for our future, and I alsobelieve the people I've shared that information areresponsible people, not out for claim of fame,personal gain, nor anything other than helping theirpeers in their beef production industry.I'll be in touch. I am very impressed. And I wantto discuss the List Serv deal with you, in detail.Will communicate with you again, tomorrow (today, it's1:21am CST now) and I need some sleep.Thanks again for being willing to share yourinformation with me.Best Regards, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxP.S. The USDA/Canadian Export of Meat into USAinformation has been sent to R-Calf's Bill Bullard.I did not mention you as the source provider....justlet me know how you want me to deal with this. I havethe contacts that need the info...you have theresearch....and we both deserve a little bit of creditfor our efforts, as I see it.See ya later.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

==============================================
**********************************************
==============================================


-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Fwd: Our PR Campaign is now official! Please distribute
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:55:08 -0800 (PST)
From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: flounder@wt.net


Dear Terry: This press release is a partial resultof contributions you have made to me in the past 10days. Don't ever think there aren't those in thecattle industry that don't care. Some of the peopleon this list are those that have received theinformation you've shared with me, so far, that can beeffective WHEN ACCURATE INFORMATION IS PROVIDED THEM! Many of the people on this list are "grass-roots"cattle producers in the United States. They strive toproduce top-quality "safe" beef. And they are usuallypretty open-minded people.Please realize one thing: You are so far ahead ofthese people with your own research, that they mighthave a hard time comprehending the information we"feed" to them. They, too, have been conditioned tobelieve the same sad lies that USDA has been tellingeveryone. It takes time to absorb things.These are usually very conservative people....so weneed to keep the politics out of it.I think we've done a fantastic job of workingtogether, so far, and I really want that to continue.All the Best, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
P.S. It's taken me four years to cultivate the trustwith some of these people on this list. And then,there are others on the list I have known, nearly allmy life.P.P.S. How would you prefer I handle the e-mailsyou've shared with me today?
snip........end..........tss


===============================================================
*************************************************************
===============================================================



-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: Update/R-Calf Suit against USDA March 7, Canadian Border Re-opening
Date: Sun, 27 Feb 2005 15:54:21 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net>
To: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
References: <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>



hey there xxxxxxxxx,

hello. good speaking with you last night. left me thinking about
the wyoming governor. did he really change his mind due to the
info i sent you? i was trying to explain this to the wife and she
did not understand why r-calf would want me to testify, then
i tried to explain to her about the this and that and then got
confused myself. thought in case some one was to knock on the
door, i would put something together, some good stuff, ill be damn
if i did not run of of ink again. i had already had a briefcase ready
to go from the last time i thought i might have to testify before
congress, but that fell through because of funding at last minute
etc. long story. gotta goo...............terry

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

Stand by for a phone call. Gary
------------------------------------------------------
--- "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net> wrote:


---------------------------------

if i testify to anything, it will be everything. all
or none.

testify to whom? where? when? cost$ (i have not worked

since oct. 87 due to my neck) etc$

testify to what?

give me the run down?

terry

xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

Dear Terry: We've got a chance to make some
progress.Your research will be essential. Are you
willing totestify?I need to know what you want me to
do.Gary
---------------------------------------------------------
"Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net> wrote:

I am still puzzled as to why our USDA is such a

puppet

to the OIE. That's bothered me ever since I
gotinvolved in all the FAD news world-wide in

2000-2001.

hey there burkie, my comments on OIE below.if you do
not hear from me sometimes, i am here,just sometimesi
don't look up for days and reply to my email.every now
and theni come up for air and read and reply to
emails. justnot enough time inthe
day.............later..........terry.


======================================================
******************************************************
======================================================


-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Update/R-Calf Suit against USDA March 7, Canadian Border Re-opening
Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2005 15:32:32 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net>
To: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <>
References: <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>


if i testify to anything, it will be everything. all or none.

testify to whom? where? when? cost$ (i have not worked
since oct. 87 due to my neck) etc$

testify to what?

give me the run down?

terry

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

Dear Terry: We've got a chance to make some progress.

Your research will be essential. Are you willing to
testify?

I need to know what you want me to do.


xxxx


=============================================
*********************************************
=============================================




----- Original Message -----
From: "xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <flounder9@verizon.net>
Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 10:53 AM
Subject: Re: Fw: Found: BSE Research Expert


> Dear Terry:
>
> This just came in.
>
>
> I've laid the ground work for you to do what you do
> best.
>
> All the best,
>
> xxxxxxxxxxx
> -----------------------------------------------------
>
>
> --- RM Thornsberry <xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Mr. xxxxxxxxx,
> >
> > I am chairman of the BSE Committee for R-CALF. I am
> > looking for information
> > concerning a Japanese company developing a live
> > animal BSE test which was to
> > be available by summer of 2005.
> >
> > I would be very interested in visiting with the
> > gentleman you referr to.
> > R-CALF may be conducting a BSE Roundtable again this
> > summer. This gentleman
> > may want to be involved. If he allows, send me his
> > email address and I will
> > send him the Proceedings from the BSE Roundtable
> > that I put together in
> > December, 2003.
> >
> > Dr. Thornsberry
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > To: R. Max Thornsberry <xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 11:37 AM
> > Subject: FW: Found: BSE Research Expert
> >
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > P.O. Box xxxxxxxxxx
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > www.ranchfoodsdirect.com
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> > > Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 9:26 PM
> > > To: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Cc: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Subject: Found: BSE Research Expert
> > >
> > > [Private to you three recipients]
> > >
> > > Dear xxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
> > >
> > > I have gained the confidence of an individual who
> > > lives here in the States, who probably has done
> > the
> > > most independent catalogueing of BSE research that
> > > exists. He has done over seven years of
> > accumulating
> > > this information, and can supply so much stuff up
> > in a
> > > matter of a few minutes that it just plain boggles
> > my
> > > mind.
> > >
> > > He can site incidents, cases, USDA lies, UK
> > research,
> > > European research, at will.
> > >
> > > His mother died of vCJD....hence the impetus of
> > his
> > > personal interest and research.
> > >
> > > Just like myself and my xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
> > and
> > > this individual I am talking about, as we all
> > began
> > > studying things independently, it has become more
> > and
> > > more apparent that alot of the "so-called" science
> > > driving world BSE policy has been "a little bit
> > less
> > > than scientific, and much more developed to serve
> > > special interests," which continues to compromise
> > any
> > > policy in any country.
> > >
> > > I have talked personally to this person, find him
> > to
> > > be credible and very much opposed to USDA's flaws
> > and
> > > failures, regarding food safety, in general. He
> > is
> > > colorful and believeable.
> > >
> > > Now then, why I am I writing to tell you this?
> > >
> > > Well, I am just plain wondering, out loud, if
> > R-Calf
> > > would be willing to have him testify at these
> > > hearings.
> > >
> > > I have asked him if he would be willing to
> > testify.
> > > His answer is that he would.
> > >
> > > As with any "expert witness," he would be entitled
> > to
> > > some kind of compensation for his time and
> > research
> > > and testimony. Air fare, hotel accomodation,
> > food
> > > and remuneration for the testimony would seem to
> > be
> > > reasonable for such a witness.
> > >
> > > So, I guess my old commodity brokerage skills come
> > > into play, in that I am asking you folks, if a
> > person
> > > like this could be of use to the R-Calf cause?
> > >
> > > I am asking for your input and feedback.
> > >
> > > I do believe his testimony could be useful.
> > >
> > > What do you all think?
> > >
> > >
> > > Hope to hear back from you soon, either way. Yes
> > or
> > > no. Perhaps you can contact your folks at R-Calf
> > to
> > > see what they think, too.
> > >
> > > Best Regards,
> > >
> > >
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >


================================
***************************************************
================================


----- Original Message -----
From: "xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <flounder9@verizon.net>
Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 3:02 PM
Subject: Re: Fw: Found: BSE Research Expert


>
> --- xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Hello, Dr. Thornsberry:
> >
> > I am pleased to acknowledge your request. Amazing
> > events with regard to reportable animal disease
> > issues
> > this week, world-wide.
> >
> > I have forwarded your request to the individual I
> > have
> > been corresponding with.
> >
> > He is:
> >
> > Mr. Terry S. Singletary, Sr.
> > Baycliff, Texas
> >
> > e-mail address: flounder9@verizon.net
> >
> > I really hope the two of you can work together, to
> > provide insight into the "real" science of BSE.
> >
> > Best Regards,
> >
> > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > P.S. Terry has an unlisted phone number. I don't
> > feel
> > that I have the latitude to reveal that, although I
> > feel certain Terry will be glad to visit with you.
> >
> > P.P.S. My telephone is: xxxxxxxxx. It also
> > works
> > as a voice mail, if we're not able to answer a call.
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > I assure you that Terry can be of help to the R-Calf
> > cause.
> >
> >


====================================
*********************************************************
====================================


----- Original Message -----
From: "RM Thornsberry" <cowman@webound.com>
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@verizon.net>
Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2005 10:04 AM
Subject: Re: U.S. checking for possible case of mad cow disease Friday,June 10, 2005


> MR. Singeltary,
>
> Thank you for sending me your email messages. If the USDA is consistent,
> they are inconsistent in following their own rules.
>
> If I understand the way this testing works; the first test is taken from a
> portion of mascerated brain tissue from the obex portion of the brain stem.
> This ground up tissue sample is several grams, but could include bacteria,
> fungi, prions from other TSE diseases besides BSE, and the six chain amino
> acid string could be identified by tagging it with antibodies. If this
> test is positive (inconclusive), then a histopathological section of the
> brain tissue is washed in antibodies to see if this six chain amino acid
> string is in the tissue itself. The antibodies have a dye attached to them.
> If the antibodies attach to this six chain amino acid string, they it
> confirms that BSE prions are actually in the brain tissue and not just in
> the macerated brain tissue sample. Is this correct? The second test is the
> IHC test and is considered conclusive and positive.
>
>
> Dr. Thornsberry


================================================
****************************************************************************
================================================


----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@verizon.net>
To: "RM Thornsberry" <xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2005 2:10 PM
Subject: Re: U.S. checking for possible case of mad cow disease Friday,June 10, 2005


> hello Dr. Thornsberry,
>
> had to come up for air and i saw your email.
> can you believe all this crap? simply amazing.
> i see some of the media reports, i belive it was
> cnn, there saying the damn cow tested negative the
> first time. this is not true, the damn cow tested postive
> two different times at first.
>
>
> Dr. Thornsberry, i ask a very good friend about your question,
> to get a better anwer than i could give you. There reply;
>
> >>>If I understand the way this testing works; the first test is taken from
> a
> portion of mascerated brain tissue from the obex portion of the brain stem.
> This ground up tissue sample is several grams, but could include bacteria,
> fungi, prions from other TSE diseases besides BSE, ...<<<
>
> No. these are all red herrings. The obex is completely sterile region of the
> brain stem. Conceivablly they could contaminate the bent spatula used to
> remove the obex and transfer in disease from the previous animal. however i
> think this is highly implausible way of getting two positives in a row.
> Bacteria and fungi are totally irrelevent as first they are not present and
> second contain nothing that cross reacts with these antibodies.
>
> For immunohistochemistry, they keep the cell structure intact. Not
> macerated. histo means cell. they stain the cells with antibody to bovine
> bse and look for ring of infectious prion plaque deposits. Only the US
> considers IHC the gold standard. Of little interest to EU, UK, or Japan
> which are much further along in testing and past the point of denial
>
> For the BioRad and Prionics test, a positive means the brain stem is
> positive. that is part of the brain. it is much more than six amino acids --
> they must be folded correctly in prpsc. It is impossible that maceration
> introduces false positivess -- they have done 20 million controls.
> ..............end..............tss
>
> Dr. Thornsberry,
>
> I addressed this to two of the top TSE scientist;
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: RE: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS
> Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2005 09:19:49 +0100
> From: "Adriano Aguzzi" <adriano@pathol.unizh.ch>
> To: "'Terry S. Singeltary Sr.'" <flounder@wt.net>
>
>
> Dear Mr. Singeltary
>
> I sympathize with your wish to have the most sensitive assay implemented.
> However, the situation is not as simple as one might think. In the case of
> homogeneously distributed agent, biochemical detection of PrPSc is indeed
> likely to be more sensitive than immunohistochemistry. In the case of
> variegated, punctate distribution of the agent, morphological methods may
> indeed be an asset.
>
> There are also issues of feasibility. In my laboratory, we routinely run
> phosphotungstic acid precipitation followed by Western blotting. However,
> this is an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure. The sensitivity is
> increased vastly, but the amount of work needed is also amazing. There is
> no way I could see our own procedure implemented for mass screening of
> millions of cows - unless one would draft a veritable army of laboratory
> technicians.
>
> For all these reasons, while I see all your points, I feel unable to offer a
> strong public opinion in favor or against any specific methods. The final
> decision needs to take into account a variety of complex factors, and that
> is why I believe that it is best left to a panel of experts rather than to a
> public discussion.
>
> Best regards
> Adriano Aguzzi
> ____________________________
> Prof. Adriano Aguzzi
> (MD PhD hc FRCP FRCPath)
> Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zürich
> Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland
> Tel. ++41-1-255 2107
> Tel. (direct line): 2869
> Fax: ++41-1-255 4402, cellular: +41-79-320 1516
> http://www.unizh.ch/pathol/neuropathologie/
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder@wt.net]
> Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 20:18
> To: adriano@pathol.unizh.ch
> Subject: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS
>
> Greetings again Professor Aguzzi,
>
> A kind greetings from Texas. I hope you do not mind, but I
> must ask you several questions that will put you in the hot seat.
> Someone with credibility must come forward, such as yourself
> and speak out about the fact of the non scientific approach that
> USDA et al has take after the first diagnosis of BSE in the USA.
> This being, the refusal to use Western Blot on any suspicious or
> inconclusive BSE/TSE test. IHC is like a brain biopsy on trying
> to diagnose a CJD case. IF you take the sample from a part of the
> brain that is not that tainted, you will not get a reading. WB is much
> more sensitive, especially now with the Phospohtugstic acid
> precipitation step. IF Prusiners CDI was validated, who knows,
> that might even be more sensitive. Bottom line, we need you to
> come forward and state publicly ''the facts'' about USDA et al
> decision not to use WB on not only questionable samples, but on
> ALL samples. would you be willing to comment on this, to me or
> someone from the media (under the understanding it will be for
> the public)? I have several questions for you??? This is very very
> important in terms of human health (i.e. that nov. pos. pos. incl. neg
> cow).
>
> P.S. there is one other top TSE scientist that has come forward
> and said what the USDA et al did with that cow was ''not logical''.
> (this will not be published for another 3 or 4 weeks).
> ONE other TOP TSE scientist saying the same thing would be
> much better for the public to hear and understand. anyway,
> does not hurt to ask, and i hope you come through here for us.
> I know this is a very loaded question, but times a wasting, and
> human health is at risk here...
>
> thank you,
> with kindest regards,
>
> I am sincerely,
>
> Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
>
>
> CJD WATCH
>
> http://www.fortunecity.com/healthclub/cpr/349/part1cjd.htm
>
>
> CJD Watch message board
>
> http://disc.server.com/Indices/167318.html
>
>
>
> ===========================================
> ===========================================
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS COW
> WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
> Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
> To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
>
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
>
> Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys
>
> 1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?
>
> The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad test.
> If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted with the
> Western blot test.
>
> 2. How long has this been the case?
>
> Its a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot test
> become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid
> precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is
> extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable
> with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive for
> low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples. It has
> been made more sensitive.
>
> Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not standardized;
> depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the technician involved
> in the test, one can get conflicting results.
>
> 3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy and
> objectivity?
>
> Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we have
> shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more sensitive and
> its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization. If you have a weak
> signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a high concentration of
> prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss an infection by testing a
> sample with low concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal
> situations.
>
> 4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in
> Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent testing.
> In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it instead used
> the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this good science?
>
> Its not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings, you
> do another test. I can only advise, its managements duty at USDA to make
> the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid test and
> the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.
>
> 5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE. Or
> BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot detect the
> variant. Is this true?
>
> Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here in
> France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in the
> brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very different. The
> IHC test will come back negative.
>
> This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence. We do
> not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic infection.
> Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it existed if we
> werent running systematic testing in the EU.
>
> BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was
> everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due to
> low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food chain,
> and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified, even good
> cooking couldnt eliminate it.
>
> I cant stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing all
> positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.
>
> What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is that
> several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head of cattle
> and has three positives. That would indicate that there are probably
> undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease is allowed to
> amplify. You have to maintain testing.
>
> When people choose to protect their economic interests over public health,
> it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe. They always
> deny; its not OUR problem, it is our neighbors problem. And then a single
> case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic results are
> devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is present and use
> systematic testing as protection. That way, the public is reassured that it
> is not entering the food supply.
>
> By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test
> every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe, three
> times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing as by
> clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight clinical cases
> were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants, and 17 at
> slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to protect the public
> and to give them assurance that the food supply is being protected.
>
> 6. USDAs list of specified risk materials excludes some products, like
> blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our feed supply
> safe?
>
> With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves travel
> through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain and the spinal
> cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not really necessary,
> because except in cases of highly infective animals, it is unlikely that
> they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine systematic testing and
> targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal column in cattle over 30
> months, you can have a compromise that is both safer and less costly than
> expanded feed bans.
>
> Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal. But it
> has to be a total ban. It cant be given to sheep or swine or poultry. It
> would be very expensive and virtually impossible to accomplish. You can have
> farmers using the wrong feed or transportation errors.
>
> Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a thermometer. It
> not only allows us to catch the disease, it also allows us to monitor its
> progress. We can watch the levels of infectivity and if they start going up
> instead of down, we can take measures.
>
> To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of wild
> animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they can evolve
> and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with BSE. It wasnt
> very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know today.
>
> People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more expensive to
> kill and test whole herds.
>
> 7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission of BSE,
> apart from the very rare maternal transmission?
>
> Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other possibilities,
> including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk extracts, with the
> cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are using fat and grease from
> cattle.
>
> (FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective level in
> cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting infected at a
> younger age?)
>
> 8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed
> infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived. The
> press reported that the main finding was that it would take something on the
> order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create an infection, but that
> seems to be an oversimplification. Could you explain it further?
>
> The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect. The
> 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have to be
> ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of infection, and
> would test negative. In other words, even though a younger animal may be
> developing the disease, it would take a considerable amount of tissue to
> transmit the disease.
>
> An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be particularly
> dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once it reaches the
> threshold, it can become highly infective.
>
> 9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less than
> 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by comparison,
> kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the threat from BSE?
>
>
> The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected animals
> went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the SRMs, the
> brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass. Less than 200 died,
> and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the disease. What we know now
> is that one particle is not going to kill you. There has to be condensation
> of the prions to be truly dangerous.
>
> This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the crisis
> appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will allow the
> disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying attention to AIDS when
> medication seemed to control it, then were surprised when a new and more
> infectious and aggressive strain appeared, we could be surprised by a more
> serious strain of BSE. That is why I support systematic testing for the long
> term. The object is to keep levels of BSE low, and to recognize the danger
> if it suddenly pops back up. ...END
>
> TSS
>
> ######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########
>
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS
> COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 12:14:14 -0500
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
> Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
> To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
> References: <42692C1B.7090200@wt.net>
>
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
>
> IN FACT, i must bring this up again.
> IN TEXAS, when they are really worried about a mad cow,
> when the cow is clinical and stumbling and staggering, TEXAS
> does not bother TESTING the cow at all. nope, they just send
> it directly to be rendered head and all to get rid of all evidence.
> the june 2004 enhanced bse cover-up was just that. the USA
> could test every cow that goes to slaughter, and it would be meaningless
> unless properly done with the most sensitive testing to date.
> but not in TEXAS or any other state in the USA.............
>
>
> FDA Statement
>
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
> Statement
> May 4, 2004
>
> Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
> Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
>
>
> Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
>
> On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
> with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
> processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
>
> FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
> an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
> inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the
> animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
> slaughterhouse.
>
> FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
> rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
> weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
> material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
>
> Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
> because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as
> "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way
> now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule
> would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals
> (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
>
> FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
> the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed
> only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs
> have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the
> material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way
> through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the
> feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
>
> To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein
> out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established
> its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that
> the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
>
> Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
> allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action
> specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will
> not be fed to poultry.
>
> FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
> with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed
> rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only
> one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed
> rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
>
> ####
>
> http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
>
>
> Hello again Dr. Thornsberry,
>
> I hope this helped you out.
>
> I wish i could have been a fly on the wall at that BSE ROUNDTABLE event the
> other day.
>
>
> kind regards,
> terry
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "RM Thornsberry" <xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@verizon.net>
> Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2005 11:04 AM
> Subject: Re: U.S. checking for possible case of mad cow disease Friday,June
> 10, 2005
>
>
> > MR. Singeltary,
> >
> > Thank you for sending me your email messages. If the USDA is consistent,
> > they are inconsistent in following their own rules.
> >
> > If I understand the way this testing works; the first test is taken from
> a
> > portion of mascerated brain tissue from the obex portion of the brain
> stem.
> > This ground up tissue sample is several grams, but could include bacteria,
> > fungi, prions from other TSE diseases besides BSE, and the six chain amino
> > acid string could be identified by tagging it with antibodies. If this
> > test is positive (inconclusive), then a histopathological section of the
> > brain tissue is washed in antibodies to see if this six chain amino acid
> > string is in the tissue itself. The antibodies have a dye attached to
> them.
> > If the antibodies attach to this six chain amino acid string, they it
> > confirms that BSE prions are actually in the brain tissue and not just in
> > the macerated brain tissue sample. Is this correct? The second test is
> the
> > IHC test and is considered conclusive and positive.
> >
> >
> > Dr. Thornsberry
> >


=========================================
*****************************************************************
=========================================


----- Original Message -----
From: RM Thornsberry
To: flounder9@verizon.net
Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2005 7:11 PM
Subject: USDA Round Table in St. Paul


Mr. Singeltary,

I was at the USDA Dog and Pony show. It was pure propaganda. Thank you for your email and the responses from Europe. They have been very helpful

Have you had time to read any of my articles are the Roundtable Proceedings I sent to your a few weeks ago?

Dr. Thornsberry


=======================================================
***************************************************************************************
=======================================================



----- Original Message -----
From: "RM Thornsberry" <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@verizon.net>
Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 3:18 PM
Subject: Re: Fw: Found: BSE Research Expert


> Sir,
>
> Thank you for your response. Thank you for all the excellent information.
> I have attached to a separate email, to keep the downloading quicker, two
> MS-Word files. These are the actual proceedings of the BSE Roundtable
> conducted by R-CALF in December, 2003, and a cowboy edit. You may find them
> interesting. I have also attached two articles I have authored.
>
> Dr. Thornsberry
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <flounder9@verizon.net>
> To: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <>
> Cc: <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 3:53 PM
> Subject: Re: Fw: Found: BSE Research Expert
>
>
> > Greetings Gentleman,
> >
> > please note my new email address...
> >
> > Indeed my mother did die a most hideous death, one like i have never seen
> > before. The Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, an extremely
> > rare strain of sporadic CJDs, now documented (under current system) as 6
> > different phenotypes (i am only speaking of sporadic CJD). Simply meaning
> > they do not know the source and route yet. What source and route i do not
> > know, but all human and animal TSEs have a route and source. The theory of
> > all these human and animal TSEs are a spontaneous happening from a
> > misfolding protein is crap. i am no doctor, i have no PhDs, but i can
> assure
> > you of that.
> >
> > sorry, i just tend to get going when i talk about this. another time and
> day
> > for that. i will send you a bit of data i have accumulating and my
> comments
> > over the last few days. the OIE and the weakening of the BSE trading rules
> > etc. if you like, i can forward this. let me know about that.
> >
> > as far as the live BSE test in Japan coming out. i will check my sources
> > there. i know they had a symposium
> > last year and some disturbing factors were coming out ;
> >
> > According to Nov. 2 Yomiuri Newspaper, researchers of the Prion
> > Disease Research Center, the National Institute of Animal Health
> > of Japan reported in the International Symposium of Prion Diseases
> > held in Sendai from October 31 to November 2., 2004, that they
> > detected prion in the adrenal gland and peripheral (sciatic and
> > peroneal) nerves of the 11th BSE case of Japan (a 94-months old
> > cow found dead on the farm on March 4 this year).
> >
> > http://www.maff.go.jp/www/press/cont2/20041101press_7.htm
> > (only in Japanese)
> >
> >
> > > > I would be very interested in visiting with the
> > > > gentleman you referr to.
> > > > R-CALF may be conducting a BSE Roundtable again this
> > > > summer. This gentleman
> > > > may want to be involved. If he allows, send me his
> > > > email address and I will
> > > > send him the Proceedings from the BSE Roundtable
> > > > that I put together in
> > > > December, 2003.
> >
> >
> > WELL Dr. Thornsberry, my name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr. and I am very
> > pleased to meet you. wish it could have been under different
> circumstances.
> > i have a great deal on this plate of BSeee right now, more than either of
> > you can imagine, and more than i ever wanted to deal with. but someone had
> > to. there is much more to these TSEs than a hamburger. but the heart of it
> > is amplification and transmission.
> >
> > i suppose we could talk and i would testify if need be, as per Burkie said
> > in Feb. 27, 2005 email.
> >
> > Another ROUND TABLE event on BSE. There has been many, but no much ever
> > became of them. lot of chit chat, the 'sound science' has been there, but
> > nobody wants to go by that. SAME thing going on right now about BSE in
> sheep
> > and
> > goats. s*** they have known this for decades, but again, floundered. you
> > should see what we have imported here. we will have to deal with that
> sooner
> > or later too. but that is another chapter, along with those atypicals from
> > belgium that was in vermont.
> > 2 years ago they DECLARED AN EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO ATYPICAL TSE
> IN
> > SHEEP.
> > they announced immediately they were to due mouse bio-assays that were to
> > start right then. did not happen, has not
> > yet i dont think. USDA et al blamed MAFF and MAFF blamed USDA. i have it
> > all. more BSeee, more humans exposed.
> >
> > Transmission studies do not lie, only industry, lobbiest and Gov. (3 peas
> in
> > a pot) do. IN fact, Johann is having himself a BSE ROUNDTABLE EVENT ;-)
> >
> >
> > Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 22:24:23 -0500
> > Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG>
> > Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG>
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
> > Subject: BSE June 9: USDA roundtable discussion on beef safety open
> to
> > public
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> >
> > June 9: USDA roundtable discussion on beef safety open to
> public
> >
> > 5/25/2005, 10:42 AM CDT
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns recently announced USDA
> will
> > hold a roundtable discussion on June 9 regarding the safety of North
> > American beef and the changing infrastructure of the industry.
> >
> > The event will bring together USDA experts, producers,
> packers,
> > other industry groups and academia to discuss the science of BSE and the
> > economic impacts on the US beef industry.
> >
> > The roundtable discussion, "The Safety of North American Beef
> > and the Economic Effect of BSE on the US Beef Industry," will be open to
> the
> > public and held on Thursday, June 9, from 9:30-2:30 at the Andrew Boss
> > Laboratory, University of Minnesota, St. Paul campus, St. Paul, Minnesota.
> >
> > Johanns noted that data illustrating the success of USDA's
> > enhanced BSE surveillance program will be part of the roundtable
> discussion.
> >
> > "It is time to clearly present the science that underlies the
> > safety of North American beef and examine the changing infrastructure of
> the
> > industry," Johanns said.
> >
> > USDA notes that the enhanced surveillance program targets the
> > population of animals in which BSE is most likely to be detected. That
> > includes non-ambulatory or downer animals, animals exhibiting signs of a
> > central nervous system disorder or any other signs that could be
> consistent
> > with BSE and animals that die from unknown causes.
> >
> > More than 350,000 animals have been tested under the program
> and
> > all have been negative, USDA says.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.agriculture.com/ag/story.jhtml;jsessionid=BXPT15IBME4IDQFIBQNSBHQ
> >
> ?storyid=/templatedata/ag/story/data/agNews_050525crBSEMTG.xml&catref=ag1040
> >
> >
> > > The event will bring together USDA experts, producers, packers, other
> > industry groups and academia to discuss the science of BSE and the
> economic
> > impacts on the US beef industry. <
> >
> >
> > WELL, we know how that works ;
> >
> > STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed
> > compounders.
> >
> > To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse
> > publicity.
> >
> > To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by
> > maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw
> > material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any
> > changes which may be required.
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > THE FUTURE
> >
> > 4..........
> >
> > MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at
> > handling potentially explosive issues.
> >
> > 5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which
> > contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive
> > test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly
> > supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.
> >
> > 6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed
> > compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct
> > linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases,
> > the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...
> >
> > SEE full text ;
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf
> >
> >
> > >"It is time to clearly present the science that underlies the safety of
> > North American beef and examine the changing infrastructure of the
> > industry," Johanns said. <
> >
> > >USDA notes that the enhanced surveillance program targets the population
> of
> > animals in which BSE is most likely to be detected. That includes
> > non-ambulatory or downer animals, animals exhibiting signs of a central
> > nervous system disorder or any other signs that could be consistent with
> BSE
> > and animals that die from unknown causes. <
> >
> >
> > not true;
> >
> >
> >
> > PLEASE note, the june 2004 BSE enhanced surveillance
> > was meaningless and ''NOT SCIENTIFIC'' without WB.
> >
> > just ask the experts ;
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS COW
> > WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
> > Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
> > Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
> > To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
> >
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
> >
> > Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys
> >
> > 1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?
> >
> > The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad
> test.
> > If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted with the
> > Western blot test.
> >
> > 2. How long has this been the case?
> >
> > Its a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot test
> > become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid
> > precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is
> > extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable
> > with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive
> for
> > low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples. It has
> > been made more sensitive.
> >
> > Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not standardized;
> > depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the technician involved
> > in the test, one can get conflicting results.
> >
> > 3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy and
> > objectivity?
> >
> > Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we have
> > shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more sensitive
> and
> > its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization. If you have a
> weak
> > signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a high concentration
> of
> > prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss an infection by testing
> a
> > sample with low concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal
> > situations.
> >
> > 4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in
> > Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent testing.
> > In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it instead
> used
> > the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this good science?
> >
> > Its not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings, you
> > do another test. I can only advise, its managements duty at USDA to make
> > the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid test and
> > the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.
> >
> > 5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE. Or
> > BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot detect
> the
> > variant. Is this true?
> >
> > Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here
> in
> > France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in the
> > brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very different. The
> > IHC test will come back negative.
> >
> > This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence. We
> do
> > not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic infection.
> > Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it existed if we
> > werent running systematic testing in the EU.
> >
> > BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was
> > everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due to
> > low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food
> chain,
> > and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified, even good
> > cooking couldnt eliminate it.
> >
> > I cant stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing
> all
> > positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.
> >
> > What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is
> that
> > several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head of
> cattle
> > and has three positives. That would indicate that there are probably
> > undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease is allowed
> to
> > amplify. You have to maintain testing.
> >
> > When people choose to protect their economic interests over public health,
> > it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe. They
> always
> > deny; its not OUR problem, it is our neighbors problem. And then a
> single
> > case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic results are
> > devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is present and use
> > systematic testing as protection. That way, the public is reassured that
> it
> > is not entering the food supply.
> >
> > By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test
> > every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe,
> three
> > times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing as by
> > clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight clinical cases
> > were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants, and 17 at
> > slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to protect the
> public
> > and to give them assurance that the food supply is being protected.
> >
> > 6. USDAs list of specified risk materials excludes some products, like
> > blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our feed supply
> > safe?
> >
> > With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves
> travel
> > through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain and the
> spinal
> > cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not really necessary,
> > because except in cases of highly infective animals, it is unlikely that
> > they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine systematic testing and
> > targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal column in cattle over 30
> > months, you can have a compromise that is both safer and less costly than
> > expanded feed bans.
> >
> > Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal. But
> it
> > has to be a total ban. It cant be given to sheep or swine or poultry. It
> > would be very expensive and virtually impossible to accomplish. You can
> have
> > farmers using the wrong feed or transportation errors.
> >
> > Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a thermometer.
> It
> > not only allows us to catch the disease, it also allows us to monitor its
> > progress. We can watch the levels of infectivity and if they start going
> up
> > instead of down, we can take measures.
> >
> > To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of wild
> > animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they can
> evolve
> > and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with BSE. It wasnt
> > very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know today.
> >
> > People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more expensive
> to
> > kill and test whole herds.
> >
> > 7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission of
> BSE,
> > apart from the very rare maternal transmission?
> >
> > Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other possibilities,
> > including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk extracts, with the
> > cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are using fat and grease from
> > cattle.
> >
> > (FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective level
> in
> > cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting infected at
> a
> > younger age?)
> >
> > 8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed
> > infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived. The
> > press reported that the main finding was that it would take something on
> the
> > order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create an infection, but that
> > seems to be an oversimplification. Could you explain it further?
> >
> > The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect. The
> > 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have to be
> > ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of infection,
> and
> > would test negative. In other words, even though a younger animal may be
> > developing the disease, it would take a considerable amount of tissue to
> > transmit the disease.
> >
> > An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be particularly
> > dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once it reaches the
> > threshold, it can become highly infective.
> >
> > 9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less
> than
> > 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by c

[flounder]

PART 2



> > 9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less
> than
> > 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by comparison,
> > kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the threat from BSE?
> >
> >
> > The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected
> animals
> > went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the SRMs, the
> > brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass. Less than 200
> died,
> > and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the disease. What we know
> now
> > is that one particle is not going to kill you. There has to be
> condensation
> > of the prions to be truly dangerous.
> >
> > This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the crisis
> > appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will allow the
> > disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying attention to AIDS when
> > medication seemed to control it, then were surprised when a new and more
> > infectious and aggressive strain appeared, we could be surprised by a more
> > serious strain of BSE. That is why I support systematic testing for the
> long
> > term. The object is to keep levels of BSE low, and to recognize the danger
> > if it suddenly pops back up. ...END
> >
> > TSS
> >
> > ######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
> ##########
> >
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: Re: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS
> > COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
> > Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 12:14:14 -0500
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
> > Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
> > To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
> > References: <42692C1B.7090200@wt.net>
> >
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
> >
> > IN FACT, i must bring this up again.
> > IN TEXAS, when they are really worried about a mad cow,
> > when the cow is clinical and stumbling and staggering, TEXAS
> > does not bother TESTING the cow at all. nope, they just send
> > it directly to be rendered head and all to get rid of all evidence.
> > the june 2004 enhanced bse cover-up was just that. the USA
> > could test every cow that goes to slaughter, and it would be meaningless
> > unless properly done with the most sensitive testing to date.
> > but not in TEXAS or any other state in the USA.............
> >
> >
> > FDA Statement
> >
> > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
> > Statement
> > May 4, 2004
> >
> > Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
> > Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
> >
> >
> > Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
> >
> > On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
> cow
> > with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
> > processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
> >
> > FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
> > an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
> > inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the
> > animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from
> the
> > slaughterhouse.
> >
> > FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
> > rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over
> the
> > weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
> > material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
> >
> > Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
> > because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as
> > "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no
> way
> > now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule
> > would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant
> animals
> > (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
> >
> > FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
> > the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed
> > only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed.
> Pigs
> > have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use
> the
> > material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way
> > through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the
> > feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
> >
> > To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
> protein
> > out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established
> > its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed
> that
> > the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
> >
> > Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
> > allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action
> > specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it
> will
> > not be fed to poultry.
> >
> > FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
> > with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed
> > rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only
> > one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed
> > rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
> >
> > ####
> >
> > http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
> >
> > TSS
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Date
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > APHIS Statement: June 29 Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative
> > <http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0275.04.html> 07/02/2004
> >
> > APHIS Statement: First Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative
> > <http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0272.04.html> 06/30/2004
> >
> > APHIS Statement Regarding Second Inconclusive BSE Test
> > <http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0266.04.html> 06/29/2004
> >
> > APHIS Statement Regarding First Inconclusive BSE Test
> > <http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0198.04.html> 06/25/2004
> >
> > Week 25
> > (11/1511/21)
> > 7,900
> > 1
> > Negative
> > 0
> > 7,901
> >
> > Week 5
> > (6/287/4)
> > 3,500
> > 1
> > Negative
> > 0
> > 3,501
> > Week 4
> > (6/216/27)
> > 3,254
> > 1
> > Negative
> > 0
> > 3,255
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > USDA orders silence on mad cow in Texas
> >
> > By Steve Mitchell
> > United Press International
> > Published 5/11/2004 10:16 PM
> >
> > WASHINGTON, May 11 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture has issued
> an
> > order instructing its inspectors in Texas, where federal mad cow disease
> > testing policies recently were violated, not to talk about the cattle
> > disorder with outside parties, United Press International has learned.
> >
> > The order, sent May 6 by e-mail from the USDA's Dallas district office,
> was
> > issued in the wake of the April 27 case at Lone Star Beef in San Angelo,
> in
> > which a cow displaying signs of a brain disorder was not tested for mad
> cow
> > disease despite a federal policy to screen all such animals.
> >
> > The deadly illness also is known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
> >
> > Both the USDA and its Inspector General -- amid allegations that an
> offsite
> > supervisor overruled the opinion of the inspectors onsite and made the
> final
> > decision not to test the animal -- have opened up investigations to
> > determine why agency policy was violated.
> >
> > The order, which was obtained by UPI, was issued by Ijaz Qazi, circuit
> > supervisor for the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service's Dallas
> > district, which covers the entire state. It reads: "All BSE inquiries MUST
> > be directed to Congressional Public Affairs Phone 202-720-9113 attention
> Rob
> > Larew OR Steve Khon. This is an urgent message. Any question contact me.
> > Ijaz Qazi."
> >
> > Although the language might sound innocuous, experienced inspectors
> familiar
> > with USDA parlance have taken to referring to the notice as a "gag order."
> >
> > The National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals -- the national
> > inspectors union -- considers the order a violation of inspectors' free
> > speech rights and is considering legal action against the USDA for
> breaching
> > the labor agreement they have with the agency.
> >
> > Inspectors alleged the order also suggests the agency is concerned about
> its
> > personnel leaking damaging information about either the Texas case or the
> > USDA's overall mad cow disease surveillance program, which has come under
> > fire since the discovery of an infected cow in Washington state last
> > December.
> >
> > "Anytime the government suppresses an individual's freedom of speech,
> that's
> > unconstitutional," Gary Dahl, president of Local 925, the Colorado
> > inspectors union, told UPI.
> >
> > Stanley Painter, chairman of the National Joint Council, said the USDA has
> > sent out notices in the past stating inspectors cannot talk to reporters.
> >
> > "It's an intimidation thing," Painter told UPI. Inspectors have the right
> to
> > talk to anybody about any subject, as long as they clarify they are not
> > speaking on behalf of the USDA and they are not doing it on government
> time,
> > he said.
> >
> > USDA spokesman Steven Cohen said he was not familiar with the notice from
> > the Dallas office. He said he would look into it, but did not respond by
> > UPI's publication time. In general, Cohen said, "There's an expectation
> any
> > statement on behalf of the agency would come from the office of
> > communications (in Washington.)"
> >
> > Asked if employees could speak freely as long as they clarified that their
> > views did not reflect those of the agency, Cohen said, "We'd rather that
> > agency policy be communicated by those in a position to speak for the
> > agency."
> >
> > Qazi told UPI the notice was not issued in conjunction with the Texas case
> > and it was routine agency practice that outside inquiries be referred to
> the
> > Washington office. He said inspectors are free to talk to outside parties,
> > including reporters, and he did not consider the e-mail a violation of the
> > labor agreement with the inspectors.
> >
> > Painter said the USDA's efforts to keep its employees from talking about
> mad
> > cow would be better spent "with issues like protecting the consuming
> public
> > instead of trying to hide things." He added he would "just about bet his
> > last nickel" agency management was attempting to suppress information
> about
> > the Texas case.
> >
> > "To keep federal employees from reporting government waste, misuse of
> > appropriations -- those types of things -- that's not a good thing
> either,"
> > Dahl said. "If there is something wrong, let's get it out in the open --
> > let's get it fixed. We're working for the public, the American consumers.
> I
> > think they have the right to know this," he said.
> >
> > "And believe me there's so many indicators saying that the USDA's mad cow
> > testing program is broken," Dahl added.
> >
> > At least one member of Congress, Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, agrees.
> >
> > Harkin, a long-time critic of the USDA, sent a letter to Agriculture
> > Secretary Ann Veneman on Monday, saying the Texas incident "calls into
> > question the effectiveness and reliability of USDA's current and proposed
> > surveillance system."
> >
> > The USDA has proposed testing more than 200,000 cows -- or 10 times its
> > current rate -- in an expanded program scheduled to begin June 1. Harkin
> > wrote in the five-page letter, however, that given the realities of the
> > cattle industry, it is "quite doubtful" the USDA will be able to test that
> > many cows, particularly because it had difficulty finding 20,000 last
> year.
> >
> > "We simply cannot tolerate a BSE testing system that fails to give valid
> > answers to critical questions for U.S. consumers and foreign customers,"
> > Harkin said in the letter, which sharply criticizes the agency's failure
> to
> > address explicitly how its new surveillance program will be implemented.
> >
> > "We look forward to receiving (Harkin's) letter and having the opportunity
> > to review it and respond to him," USDA spokesman Ed Loyd told UPI. "USDA
> has
> > acknowledged there was a failure in not testing that cow in Texas for BSE,
> > so we are all working to ensure that does not occur again."
> >
> > Jim Rogers, a spokesman for USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
> > Service, which oversees the agency's mad cow surveillance program, told
> UPI
> > the agency has tested about 15,500 animals since fiscal year 2004 began,
> on
> > Oct. 1, 2003. However, the agency has refused to identify the states and
> > facilities from which the cows originated. Rogers said UPI would have to
> > seek that information through the Freedom of Information Act.
> >
> > The question is central to the USDA's implementation of its expanded
> > surveillance program. Downer cows -- those unable to stand or walk -- made
> > up the bulk of the animals the agency tested for mad cow in previous
> years,
> > but these were banned from being slaughtered for human consumption in
> > December. This means the agency inspectors no longer can obtain brain
> > samples from these cows at slaughterhouses as they could in the past.
> >
> > Furthermore, the USDA has not provided any evidence it has worked out
> > agreements with rendering facilities or ranchers, where downers and dead
> > cows are now most likely to be found, to obtain the extra animals for
> > testing.
> >
> > Loyd said the agency is "working very hard to get animals on the farm that
> > would never show up in a processing facility," and he was "not aware of
> any
> > issues" that would delay the launch of the new program.
> >
> > However, he was unable to provide the names or locations of the rendering
> > facilities where the agency will be obtaining cow brains for BSE testing.
> He
> > said he would look into it but did not return two follow-up phone calls
> from
> > UPI before publication.
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com
> >
> > Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International
> >
> > http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040511-015527-4917r
> >
> >
> > USDA did not test possible mad cows
> >
> > By Steve Mitchell
> > United Press International
> > Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM
> >
> > WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims it
> > tested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last
> > year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the
> > agency tested only half that number.
> >
> > USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state
> > veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested
> using
> > the "gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming a case of
> the
> > deadly disease. Instead, the state labs used a less sensitive test that
> > experts say could miss mad cow cases.
> >
> > In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004 USDA
> > document estimating the number of animals most likely to be infected among
> > U.S. herds, and apparently were not given to a congressional committee
> that
> > had requested agency data on the number of cows with brain disorder signs
> > that had been tested for the disease.
> >
> > "This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia
> > Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project, a
> > group in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.
> >
> > "If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to
> > have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on the
> > reliability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.
> >
> > Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program closely
> > for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding testing animals
> > that look like they have the disease?"
> >
> > Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder
> symptoms
> > have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which USDA
> > officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known as
> central
> > nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA policy, which
> > stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are considered the
> > most likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the Washington cow that
> tested
> > positive last December is the only confirmed case of mad cow disease --
> also
> > known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.
> >
> > The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress because
> > humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant
> Creutzfeldt-Jakob
> > disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow pathogen. If the
> > USDA's surveillance program is allowing the riskiest cows to go untested,
> it
> > raises concerns about the ability of the monitoring system to detect the
> > disease reliably in U.S. herds, Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a
> > May 13 letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.
> >
> > Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows
> should
> > be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a sound
> > surveillance system.
> >
> > "CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said
> > Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance
> > program.
> >
> > "If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it,
> because
> > they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America," he told
> > UPI. "Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a major case
> of
> > malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test the brain of that
> > animal to see if it was indeed infected is really a failure to protect the
> > public."
> >
> > USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows occur
> in
> > U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least one other
> media
> > outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year 2003. Yet agency
> > testing records for the first 10 months of FY 2003, obtained by UPI under
> > the Freedom of Information Act, show only 254 animals that fall under the
> > CNS category -- or about half the number Loyd cited.
> >
> > After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification
> of
> > the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that an
> > additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two months
> > of FY 2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases tested at
> > various state veterinary diagnostic laboratories.
> >
> > "We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic
> > laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for BSE
> > using a histological examination," Loyd said.
> >
> > "We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the USDA
> > lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he said.
> > "This (state laboratory) information contributes important data to our
> > surveillance effort."
> >
> > However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which
> the
> > USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease.
> Instead,
> > the labs used a different test called histopathology, which the USDA
> itself
> > does not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more sensitive IHC
> > test.
> >
> > The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions --
> > misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be spotted
> > early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens for the
> > microscopic holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced mad cow
> > disease.
> >
> > According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if
> the
> > brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there is
> too
> > much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult to confirm
> a
> > diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures may have begun
> to
> > disintegrate.
> >
> > That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm a
> > diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for
> shipping.
> >
> > The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003, as
> > well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain why
> this
> > information was not included in the testing records the agency provided to
> > UPI and has not responded to requests for the identity of the state labs.
> >
> > Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's mad
> cow
> > testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is adequate for
> > screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said, it would
> likely
> > be an advanced stage that should be obvious.
> >
> > Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test such as
> > IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can miss
> > evidence of infection.
> >
> > The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers similar
> > recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology test. The
> > protocol states that even if histopathology is negative, "further sampling
> > should be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs have strongly
> suggested
> > BSE" -- a criteria that includes all of the cows tested at the state labs.
> >
> > The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded
> > surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or
> another
> > test called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on rapid tests.
> > The March 15 document that describes the new program does not mention
> using
> > histopathology to confirm cases of mad cow disease.
> >
> > "Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not be
> > as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE
> > expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that
> provides
> > advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.
> >
> > "Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford told
> > UPI.
> >
> > She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology
> > test -- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used
> > initially for screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.
> >
> > Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the
> Swiss
> > firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease,
> > agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by histopathology.
> >
> > "There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly
> > positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing based
> > on histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons why
> > Germany was allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they were
> not"
> > in 2000, Moser told UPI.
> >
> > He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most
> > cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in
> some
> > CNS cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.
> >
> > "It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes in
> a
> > diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to tissue
> > damage during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.
> >
> > Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually
> yielded
> > a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his original
> > figure of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500 or 565,
> > however, either figure would exceed the agency's own estimates for the
> total
> > number of such cows that it identifies annually.
> >
> > According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government
> > Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its
> > expanded surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at
> > slaughterhouses. Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms
> annually.
> > At most, that yields a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or nearly 200 less
> > than the 565 Loyd claims the agency tested.
> >
> > The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of CNS
> > animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also does
> not
> > appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number of high-risk
> > animals that occur in the United States each year. The latter number was
> > used to help the USDA calculate the number of animals it will screen for
> mad
> > cow disease in its expanded surveillance plan.
> >
> > USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to a
> > question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close to
> > the issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking
> Democrat,
> > had requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide "the number
> of
> > BSE tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting central nervous system
> > symptoms" for each of the last five years.
> >
> > Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials did
> > not provide that information to the committee or include it in USDA's
> > explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.
> >
> > The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it
> > further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.
> >
> > "The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and BSE
> > testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman for the
> > committee, told UPI.
> >
> > --
> >
> > Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com
> >
> > Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International
> >
> > http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040608-014607-3865r
> >
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message -------- Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as
> >
> > either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43
> >
> > -0000 From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" To:
> > "'flounder@wt.net'"
> >
> > Dear Terry,
> >
> > I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am
> >
> > a Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the
> >
> > paper. I have attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention. Thank
> >
> > you for your interest in the paper.
> >
> > In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, yes. As you
> >
> > will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate
> >
> > phenotype to type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD.
> >
> > It is too early to be able to claim any further sub-classification in
> >
> > respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky Rimmer's version. It will
> >
> > take further studies, which are on-going, to establish if there are
> >
> > sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The main
> >
> > point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new
> >
> > variant CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype
> >
> > can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type
> >
> > 2 PrPSc.
> >
> >
> >
> > I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I
> >
> > can be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best
> wishes.
> >
> >
> >
> > Emmanuel Asante
> >
> > <> ____________________________________
> >
> > Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial
> >
> > College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG
> >
> > Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email:
> >
> > e.asante@ic.ac.uk (until 9/12/02)
> >
> > New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now)
> >
> > ____________________________________
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > full text ;
> >
> > http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm
> >
> >
> > AND the new findings of BASE in cattle in Italy of Identification of a
> > second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular
> > similarities with sporadic
> >
> > Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
> >
> >
> > http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1
> >
> >
> > Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates
> > and comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for
> > human health
> >
> > THE findings from Corinne Ida Lasmézas*, [dagger] , Jean-Guy Fournier*,
> > Virginie Nouvel*,
> >
> > Hermann Boe*, Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp [Dagger
> >
> > ] , Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James Ironside¶, Moira Bruce [||] , Dominique
> >
> > Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys* et al, that The agent responsible
> > for French iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is
> > very different from vCJD but is similar to that found in one case of
> > sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie isolate;
> >
> > http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1
> >
> > Characterization of two distinct prion strains
> > derived from bovine spongiform encephalopathy
> > transmissions to inbred mice
> >
> > http://vir.sgmjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/8/2471
> >
> >
> > ALL animals for human/animal consumption must be tested for TSE.
> >
> > ALL human TSEs must be made reportable Nationally and Internationally,OF
> ALL
> > AGES...TSS
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> > ####################
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: Re: USDA ANNOUNCES BSE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
> > Date: Thu, 19 May 2005 16:48:24 -0500
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
> > Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@aegee.org>
> > To: BSE-L@aegee.org
> > References: <428A3E19.7060206@wt.net>
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> > oh boy, another bse roundtable event.
> > Don't ya just love these BSE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS?
> > they been discussing BSE around round tables for years here in
> > the USA and abroad, but nobody in the USA took heed to
> > any of the science...
> >
> > MY FAVORITE ONE ;
> >
> > Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May 1989
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as an
> > overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but if it did,
> > it was very rare. The need for improved and specific surveillance
> > methods to detect it as recognized...
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory
> > responsibility for rendering plants in the US...
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
> > was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
> > the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and
> thought
> > this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
> >
> >
> > 5-9 September 1988
> > First International Conference on Alzheimer's Disease and Related
> > Disorders, Las Vegas, at which Dr. Hope gives the Seminar 'BSE:
> > A Scrapie-like Disease of British Cattle'.
> >
> >
> >
> > 27-28 June 1989 National Institutes of Health (Maryland) international
> > roundtable on BSE.
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume16/chapter1.htm
> >
> >
> > May 1992 OIE General Assembly in Paris agrees trading conditions
> > for bovine products from countries affected by BSE.
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume16/chron2.htm
> >
> >
> > and in a paper which he gave to the SERONO SYMPOSIA,
> > USA IN 1996 entitled ''Speculations on the origins of BSE of the
> > Epidemiology of CJD'' he asserted that
> >
> > ''...It is generally assumed that the origin of BSE was the feed-borne
> > transmission of scrapie to cattle. The epidemiology of BSE is entirely
> > consistent with this hypothesis.'' (M8A Tab 41)
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s483a.pdf
> >
> >
> > JAN 1992 ANOTHER BSe ROUNDTABLE EVENT
> >
> > 1: J Am Vet Med Assoc. 1992 Jan 15;200(2):164-7.
> >
> > Recommendations of the International Roundtable Workshop on Bovine
> > Spongiform Encephalopathy.
> >
> > Gibbs CJ Jr, Bolis CL, Asher DM, Bradley R, Fite RW, Johnson RT, Mahy
> > BW, McKhann GM.
> >
> > National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892.
> >
> > Recommendations of the working party were summarized as follows:
> > Determine the status in all countries of their national cattle herds
> > with respect to BSE. Attempt to develop a test to recognize BSE-infected
> > animals before they become clinically ill. Establish procedures to
> > prevent spread of BSE agent into the cattle populations, especially by
> > eliminating feeds containing rendered ruminant proteins. Review the
> > rendering processes, identify the sources and destinations of rendered
> > products, and suggest appropriate changes if needed. Especially needed
> > are standardized rendering procedures in regard to use of organic
> > solvents, temperature, and duration of heat treatment. Review import and
> > export regulations to reduce the risk of spreading BSE and to maximize
> > opportunities for safe trading in cattle and cattle products. The
> > scrapie-free certification program of the USDA was supported, and
> > similar programs might be considered by other countries. If BSE/scrapie
> > is diagnosed in a given country, determine baseline incidence of CJD in
> > those countries and consider contributing to an international registry.
> > The WHO should address the problems of BSE, formulate policy,
> > participate in and coordinate research, and provide training
> > opportunities for veterinary and human health care workers from eastern
> > European countries and developing nations. Government and private
> > agencies should consider increasing support for research on
> > transmissibility and pathogenesis of CJD, BSE, CWD, scrapie, and
> > transmissible mink encephalopathy. Prepare and publish a critical
> > neuropathologic review of all spongiform encephalopathies, naturally and
> > experimentally transmitted, defining the characteristics of each disease
> > in the various species known to be susceptible. Consider producing
> > guidelines for the biological and pharmaceutical industries with regard
> > to sourcing, collecting, and processing bovine and ovine
> > materials.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
> >
> > Publication Types:
> >
> > * Congresses
> >
> >
> > PMID: 1348501 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_ui
> > ds=1348501&dopt=Abstract
> >
> >
> > 53. The epidemiological "think tank" meeting was held on 7th February,
> > 1991 at the CVL, and Mr
> > Lowson's minutes of the meeting are exhibited at YB91/2.7/5.1 attached
> > to his letter at
> > YB91/2.18/2.1.See also YB91/2.7/2.1). The participants of the meeting
> > were: Dr Tyrrell,
> > Professor Richard Barlow, Dr Richard Kimberlin, Mr David Pepper and Dr
> > Bill Watson, as
> > SEAC members; Mr Bradley and Dr Pickles (of the Department of Health) as
> > observers; Mr
> > Lowson, and Mr Tom Murray (of the Department of Health) as the
> > Secretariat of SEAC; and
> > myself, Dr Hueston (USDA), Professor Peter Smith and Dr Paul Fine (of
> > London School of
> > Hygiene and Tropical Medicine), Dr Paul Brown (of NINDS, USA).
> >
> > see 'think tank' ...tss
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/02/07001001.pdf
> >
> > Others in attendance are
> > listed at Annex B of YB91/2.7/5.1 at p 5.11. The meeting endorsed the
> > work that was being
> > done by the Epidemiology Department, and did not have any major
> > suggestions to make about
> > new approaches to be pursued. The meeting also recognised the inherent
> > limitations of
> > epidemiological modelling due to biological variables such as how many
> > animals were subclinically
> > affected.
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s091a.pdf
> >
> > i could list other round table events on BSe, that the USA was very
> > much aware of, simply failed to act on, but i think most get my just here.
> > they simply did not want to implement any policies that would hinder
> > the industry, so they floundered and floundered and now, they whine,
> > while literally millions and millions of innocent humans have become
> > exposed to mad cow, deer, elk, sheep, etc disease. (TSE for short).
> >
> > BUT of course old GW has rode up on his white horse and
> > saved the day with his BSE MRR policy and the damn OIE
> > is set to approve it in there own way. i dont know who is bribing
> > who any more, but i was thinking of a better term to use than
> > bribing. i guess this stupid BSE MRR policy is better than just
> > sending the suspect BSE cases like the stumbling and staggering
> > one they rendered head and all WITH NO TEST to be rendered
> > and or the positive, positives they claim was inconclusive, until they
> > tested the damn thing enough times to come up with a false negative,
> > and all this done WITHOUT WB and still refuse to use it and or retest
> > all those suspect properly. but you will not see any mad cows in the USA
> > of any strain until the OIE buys into GWs BSE MRR policy. then
> > i predict we might see a few documented cases. but things have
> > been on hold and i dont care if they claim to test 350 thousand,
> > 1 million, or all of them, if you are cherry picken and not testing
> > them correctly and using the most sensitive test to date, you ain't
> > doing nothing, but fooling yourself. i dont think the exporting
> > consumers are willing to risk this political public health nightmare.
> > IF the OIE caves in to GWs demands on BSE regulations, then
> > like i said before, they should hang up there jock straps, cause
> > they will not need them anymore. the USA is in such a unique
> > situation with animal TSEs and the potential for a more virolent
> > strain, that any laxing of the BSE OIE regs, as weak as they are,
> > would set us back to the stone age of attempting to erradicate
> > human and animal TSEs. i am still waiting for the OIE to address
> > CWD as i was told they would do several years ago. but of
> > course i am still waiting for those VERMONT ATYPICAL
> > TSE sheep from Belgium, that we were promised mouse
> > bio-assays were to have begun. well, 2005 and they just
> > started after i addressed this issue via aphis and maff. could
> > BSE be in the USA in sheep? i guess we will have to wait
> > 2 more years...
> >
> > still disgusted in Bacliff, Texas where the speckle trout are
> > BIG outback and plentiful now, water is trout green and fine.
> > may go missing in action...
> >
> > TSS
> >
> >
> > Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote:
> >
> > > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > > #####################
> > >
> > > Release No. 0168.05
> > >
> > > Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755
> > > Jerry Redding (202) 720-6959
> > >
> > > USDA ANNOUNCES BSE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
> > >
> > >
> > > WASHINGTON, May 17, 2005-Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns today
> > > announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) will hold a
> > > roundtable discussion on June 9 regarding the safety of North American
> > > beef and the changing infrastructure of the industry. Johanns noted
> > > that data illustrating the success of USDA's enhanced BSE surveillance
> > > program will be part of the roundtable discussion entitled "The Safety
> > > of North American Beef and the Economic Effect of BSE on the U.S. Beef
> > > Industry."
> > >
> > > "It is time to clearly present the science that underlies the safety
> > > of North American beef and examine the changing infrastructure of the
> > > industry," Johanns said. "It is remarkable that we've not found a
> > > single new case of BSE throughout our year-long aggressive search. Now
> > > it is time to put into perspective for producers, processors, and
> > > decision-makers the facts and the future implications of the course we
> > > are following."
> > > The enhanced surveillance program targets the population of animals in
> > > which BSE is most likely to be detected, including non-ambulatory or
> > > downer animals, animals exhibiting signs of a central nervous system
> > > disorder or any other signs that could be consistent with BSE and
> > > animals that die from unknown causes. More than 350,000 animals have
> > > been tested and all have been negative.
> > > The event will bring together USDA experts, producers, packers, other
> > > industry groups and academia to discuss the science of BSE and the
> > > economic impacts on the U.S. beef industry.
> > > The roundtable discussion will be open to the public and held on
> > > Thursday, June 9, from 9:30-2:30 at the Andrew Boss Laboratory,
> > > University of Minnesota, St. Paul campus, St. Paul, MN. Potential
> > > participants will receive invitations.
> > >
> > > #
> > >
> > > USDA News
> > > oc.news@usda.gov
> > > 202 720-4623
> > >
> > >
> > > http://www.usda.gov/2005/05/0168.xml
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >> USDA ANNOUNCES BSE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > not...
> > >
> > >
> > > PLEASE note, the june 2004 BSE enhanced surveillance
> > >
> > > was meaningless and ''NOT SCIENTIFIC'' without WB.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > just ask the experts ;
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -------- Original Message --------
> > >
> > > Subject: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS
> > > COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
> > >
> > > Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500
> > >
> > > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> > >
> > > Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > >
> > > To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > > #####################
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad
> > > test. If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted
> > > with the Western blot test.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 2. How long has this been the case?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Its a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot
> > > test become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic
> > > acid precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped
> > > develop) is extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is
> > > extremely reliable with high-signal test results. However, it had to
> > > be made more sensitive for low-signal (samples with low density of
> > > malformed prions) samples. It has been made more sensitive.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not
> > > standardized; depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the
> > > technician involved in the test, one can get conflicting results.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy
> > > and objectivity?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we
> > > have shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more
> > > sensitive and its results are reproducible. IHC relies on
> > > localization. If you have a weak signal case, you may get lucky and
> > > test a spot with a high concentration of prions. But the opposite it
> > > true too; you can miss an infection by testing a sample with low
> > > concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal situations.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in
> > > Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent
> > > testing. In the case this November, which it announced was negative,
> > > it instead used the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is
> > > this good science?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Its not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings,
> > > you do another test. I can only advise, its managements duty at USDA
> > > to make the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the
> > > rapid test and the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another
> > > test.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE.
> > > Or BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot
> > > detect the variant. Is this true?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one
> > > here in France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The
> > > distribution in the brain is very different than we see with BSE, it
> > > looks very different. The IHC test will come back negative.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence.
> > > We do not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic
> > > infection. Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it
> > > existed if we werent running systematic testing in the EU.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was
> > > everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due
> > > to low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the
> > > food chain, and was given time to amplify. By the time it was
> > > identified, even good cooking couldnt eliminate it.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I cant stress enough that systematic testing is necessary.
> > > Withdrawing all positives from the food chain is the best way to break
> > > the cycle.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk
> > > is that several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000
> > > head of cattle and has three positives. That would indicate that there
> > > are probably undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the
> > > disease is allowed to amplify. You have to maintain testing.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > When people choose to protect their economic interests over public
> > > health, it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through
> > > Europe. They always deny; its not OUR problem, it is our neighbors
> > > problem. And then a single case is discovered and the public reacts.
> > > The economic results are devastating. It would be better to just
> > > assume BSE is present and use systematic testing as protection. That
> > > way, the public is reassured that it is not entering the food supply.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to
> > > test every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In
> > > Europe, three times as many cases of BSE have been caught by
> > > systematic testing as by clinical testing (of clearly sick animals).
> > > In 2004, eight clinical cases were discovered, 29 were discovered at
> > > rendering plants, and 17 at slaughter. We should be using these tests
> > > as a weapon to protect the public and to give them assurance that the
> > > food supply is being protected.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 6. USDAs list of specified risk materials excludes some products,
> > > like blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our
> > > feed supply safe?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves
> > > travel through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain
> > > and the spinal cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not
> > > really necessary, because except in cases of highly infective animals,
> > > it is unlikely that they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine
> > > systematic testing and targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal
> > > column in cattle over 30 months, you can have a compromise that is
> > > both safer and less costly than expanded feed bans.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal.
> > > But it has to be a total ban. It cant be given to sheep or swine or
> > > poultry. It would be very expensive and virtually impossible to
> > > accomplish. You can have farmers using the wrong feed or
> > > transportation errors.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a
> > > thermometer. It not only allows us to catch the disease, it also
> > > allows us to monitor its progress. We can watch the levels of
> > > infectivity and if they start going up instead of down, we can take
> > > measures.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of
> > > wild animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they
> > > can evolve and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with
> > > BSE. It wasnt very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know
> > > today.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more
> > > expensive to kill and test whole herds.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission
> > > of BSE, apart from the very rare maternal transmission?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other
> > > possibilities, including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk
> > > extracts, with the cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are
> > > using fat and grease from cattle.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > (FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective
> > > level in cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting
> > > infected at a younger age?)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed
> > > infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived.
> > > The press reported that the main finding was that it would take
> > > something on the order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create
> > > an infection, but that seems to be an oversimplification. Could you
> > > explain it further?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect.
> > > The 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have
> > > to be ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of
> > > infection, and would test negative. In other words, even though a
> > > younger animal may be developing the disease, it would take a
> > > considerable amount of tissue to transmit the disease.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be
> > > particularly dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once
> > > it reaches the threshold, it can become highly infective.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less
> > > than 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by
> > > comparison, kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the
> > > threat from BSE?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected
> > > animals went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the
> > > SRMs, the brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass.
> > > Less than 200 died, and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the
> > > disease. What we know now is that one particle is not going to kill
> > > you. There has to be condensation of the prions to be truly dangerous.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the
> > > crisis appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will
> > > allow the disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying
> > > attention to AIDS when medication seemed to control it, then were
> > > surprised when a new and more infectious and aggressive strain
> > > appeared, we could be surprised by a more serious strain of BSE. That
> > > is why I support systematic testing for the long term. The object is
> > > to keep levels of BSE low, and to recognize the danger if it suddenly
> > > pops back up. ...END
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > TSS
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
> > > ##########
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -------- Original Message --------
> > >
> > > Subject: Re: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON
> > > TEXAS COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
> > >
> > > Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 12:14:14 -0500
> > >
> > > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> > >
> > > Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > >
> > > To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
> > >
> > > References: <42692C1B.7090200@wt.net>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > > #####################
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > IN FACT, i must bring this up again.
> > >
> > > IN TEXAS, when they are really worried about a mad cow,
> > >
> > > when the cow is clinical and stumbling and staggering, TEXAS
> > >
> > > does not bother TESTING the cow at all. nope, they just send
> > >
> > > it directly to be rendered head and all to get rid of all evidence.
> > >
> > > the june 2004 enhanced bse cover-up was just that. the USA
> > >
> > > could test every cow that goes to slaughter, and it would be meaningless
> > >
> > > unless properly done with the most sensitive testing to date.
> > >
> > > but not in TEXAS or any other state in the USA.............
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > FDA Statement
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
> > >
> > > Statement
> > >
> > > May 4, 2004
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Media Inquiries: 301-

[flounder]

PART 3 ........SNIP..........im trying to keep this short ;


> > LET me know how i can help. we got to get it right by the science. just
> > about everything they said
> > this agent would not do, it has done...AHH, maybe you have not read this.
> > FYI ;
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> > A BSE case born in July 1998
> > BSE has been diagnosed in a Friesian cow, born on 06 July 1998, 23 months
> > after 1 August 1996, when extra control measures on animal feed containing
> > mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) were considered to have been fully
> > implemented. It was taken under the current compulsory testing programme,
> > of all animals born after 31 July 1996 slaughtered as cohorts of confirmed
> > BSE cases. We are currently slaughtering all "backlog" cohort animals as
> > part
> > of the preparation for the change in the OTM rule. Its farm of origin was
> in
> > Devon, where it remained until it was slaughtered on 03 May 2005. Disease
> > was officially confirmed on 26 May 2005.
> >
> >
> http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/controls-eradication/barbinfo/06-07-1998
> > .pdf
> >
> > A BSE case born in September 2001
> > BSE has been diagnosed in a Holstein cow, born on 28 September 2001.
> > The case was identified under the current compulsory testing programme for
> > all animals born after 31 July 1996 slaughtered as cohorts of confirmed
> BSE
> > cases. This animal was included in the cohort of the BSE case born on 3
> > October 2001 on the same farm and confirmed on 1 March 2005. This case
> > born on 28 September 2001 was born on the same farm in Dyfed and it
> > remained on this farm until it was submitted for slaughter on 12 May 2005.
> > Disease was officially confirmed on 27 May 2005. The animal was aged 43
> > months at slaughter.
> > Another case born on the same farm on 1 May 2002 has been confirmed on
> > 27 May 2005 in the same cohort. This is the first time that the UK has
> > confirmed three cases born after July 1996 with the same farm of origin.
> > Defra will be following up detailed epidemiological analysis of this case.
> > This case is being drawn to the attention of SEAC and Professor William
> > Hill.
> > Professor Hill is currently carrying out an independent assessment of the
> > possible causes of BSE cases born after the reinforced feed ban of August
> > 1996 (BARBs) at the request of Defra.
> >
> >
> http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/controls-eradication/barbinfo/28-09-2001
> > .pdf
> >
> > A BSE case born in May 2002
> > BSE has been diagnosed in a Holstein Friesian cross cow, born on 1 May
> > 2002. The case was identified under the current compulsory testing
> > programme for all animals born after 31 July 1996 slaughtered as cohorts
> of
> > confirmed BSE cases. This animal was included in the cohort of the BSE
> > case born on 3 October 2001 on the same farm and confirmed on 1 March
> > 2005. This case born on 1 May 2002 was born on the same farm in Dyfed
> > and it remained on this farm until it was submitted for slaughter on 12
> May
> > 2005. Disease was officially confirmed on 27 May 2005. The animal was
> > aged 36 months at slaughter.
> > This is the most recently born case of BSE confirmed in the UK. The
> previous
> > most recent case was the related case born on 3 October 2001.
> > Another case born on the same farm on 28 September 2002 has been
> > confirmed on 27 May 2005 in the same cohort. This is the first time that
> the
> > UK has confirmed three cases born after July 1996 with the same farm of
> > origin. Defra will be following up detailed epidemiological analysis of
> this
> > case.
> > This case is being drawn to the attention of SEAC and Professor William
> > Hill.
> > Professor Hill is currently carrying out an independent assessment of the
> > possible causes of BSE cases born after the reinforced feed ban of August
> > 1996 (BARBs) at the request of Defra.
> >
> >
> http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/controls-eradication/barbinfo/01-05-2002
> > .pdf
> >
> > A BSE case born in November 1999
> > BSE has been diagnosed in a Friesian cow, born on 26 November 1999, 39
> > months after 1 August 1996, when extra control measures on animal feed
> > containing mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) were considered to
> > have been fully implemented. It was taken under the current compulsory
> > testing programme, of all animals born after 31 July 1996 slaughtered as
> > cohorts of confirmed BSE cases. We are currently slaughtering all
> "backlog"
> > cohort animals as part of the preparation for the change in the OTM rule.
> > Its
> > farm of origin was in Wiltshire, where it remained until it was
> slaughtered
> > on
> > 22 March 2005. Disease was officially confirmed on 20 May 2005.
> >
> >
> http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/controls-eradication/barbinfo/26-11-99.p
> > df
> >
> > TSS
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
> > To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>
> > Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 8:10 AM
> > Subject: BSE DIAGNOSED IN COWS BORN IN 1998, 1999, 2001, AND 2002
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> > ####################
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> > 1
> >
> > POSITION STATEMENT
> >
> > EARLY PHASE OF vCJD INFECTION IN BLOOD TRANSFUSION
> >
> > RECIPIENTS
> >
> > Issue
> >
> > 1. The Committee on Microbiological Safety of Blood, Tissue and
> >
> > Organs has requested advice from SEAC on whether a scientific
> >
> > distinction can be drawn between historic and recent blood
> >
> > transfusion recipients in terms of the relative load of the vCJD
> >
> > agent that may be present in the bone, tissues or organs of the
> >
> > blood transfusion recipient. In the context of this question, a recent
> >
> > recipient is defined as having received a blood transfusion within
> >
> > the week prior to bone, tissue or organ donation. A historic
> >
> > recipient is defined as having received a blood transfusion in the
> >
> > more distant past.
> >
> > Background
> >
> > 2. A pre-symptomatic diagnostic test for vCJD is currently not
> >
> > available. Therefore, blood, bone, tissue or organ donors with a
> >
> > sub- or pre-clinical vCJD infection cannot be identified prior to
> >
> > donation. Two cases of vCJD infection in recipients of blood from
> >
> > donors that subsequently developed vCJD suggest that the
> >
> > disease may be transmitted from asymptomatic individuals via
> >
> > blood transfusion. Epidemiological evidence of iatrogenic
> >
> > transmission of sCJD suggests there is a potential risk of vCJD
> >
> > transmission via tissue/organ transplantation.
> >
> > 3. There are no data on the tissue distribution of vCJD infectivity in
> >
> > humans in the first week following infection by blood transfusion.
> >
> > There is some, albeit very limited, information from mouse studies
> >
> > on prion replication and spread in the early phase of infection.
> >
> > However, these studies used inocula, routes of administration and
> >
> > prion strains not directly applicable to the human blood transfusion
> >
> > situation.
> >
> > 2
> >
> > Early phase tissue accumulation of abnormal prions
> >
> > 4. On the basis of the very limited information available, it is
> >
> > considered unlikely that significant prion replication would occur in
> >
> > tissues in the first week following transfusion with infected blood.
> >
> > Thus, the level of abnormal prions accumulating in a tissue would
> >
> > probably correlate with the level of vascularisation of that tissue.
> >
> > Highly vascularised organs such as the liver, lung and spleen, as
> >
> > well as bone, would be more likely to contain the agent compared
> >
> > with other organs. At later times in the incubation period (likely to
> >
> > be well in excess of one week), the accumulation of abnormal prion
> >
> > protein and infectivity would be expected to correlate with the
> >
> > ability of various tissues to support prion replication, with the
> >
> > central nervous system containing the highest levels of infectivity.
> >
> > Relative risks
> >
> > 5. Data are too limited to allow quantification of the risks of transplant
> >
> > associated vCJD transmission from donors that have received a
> >
> > blood transfusion.
> >
> > 6. The number of pre- and sub-clinical vCJD infections in the
> >
> > population is believed to be small. Therefore, there is a small risk
> >
> > of vCJD transmission from transplantation of tissues/organs from
> >
> > all donors, irrespective of whether they have received a blood
> >
> > transfusion prior to donation. The additional risk resulting from a
> >
> > tissue/organ donor having received a blood transfusion at any time
> >
> > prior to donation is likely to be small. Furthermore, the introduction
> >
> > of precautionary safety measures to protect the blood supply, such
> >
> > as leucodepletion and exclusion of previously transfused blood
> >
> > donors, means that, in general, the risk of blood transfusionassociated
> >
> > transmission of vCJD from tissue/organ donation is, if
> >
> > anything, likely to be lower if the transfusion is recent rather than
> >
> > historic. However, it is not possible to define a threshold of lowest
> >
> > risk in terms of a specific date of, or period of time following, a
> >
> > blood transfusion.
> >
> > Possible risk reduction measures
> >
> > 7. Screening cadaveric donors for markers of infection would allow,
> >
> > depending on the sensitivity of the test used, pre- or sub-clinically
> >
> > infected donors to be identified prior to the use of the donated
> >
> > tissues/organs. Retrospective screening of donors would also help
> >
> > to inform assessment of transmission risks.
> >
> > 3
> >
> > 8. On the basis that tissue/organ infectivity levels in the very early
> >
> > stage of infection are associated with the blood content of
> >
> > tissues/organs, washing or perfusing tissues to remove blood could
> >
> > reduce the infectious load. In this respect, it would be important to
> >
> > consider processes that efficiently remove bone marrow and blood
> >
> > from bone.
> >
> > 9. Avoiding the pooling of tissues from different donors to be
> >
> > transplanted into one individual reduces transmission risks to that
> >
> > individual.
> >
> > Summary
> >
> > 10. There is no clinical evidence that vCJD has been transmitted
> >
> > through tissue/organ transplantation. However, a potential risk of
> >
> > transmission via this route exists. Relevant data are extremely
> >
> > limited but suggest that in the early phase of infection, significant
> >
> > prion replication is unlikely to occur and that, therefore, tissue
> >
> > levels of abnormal prions following recent transfusions are likely to
> >
> > be related to the blood supply to each specific tissue.
> >
> > 11. A risk of transplant associated transmission of vCJD exists from
> >
> > tissue/organ donors that have not received blood transfusions.
> >
> > The additional risk as a result of a donor having received a recent
> >
> > blood transfusion is likely to be very small. Post mortem
> >
> > assessment of donor infection would provide the best method of
> >
> > risk reduction and enable these risks to be quantified.
> >
> > 12. In assessing and communicating the risks a balance must be
> >
> > struck between the small risk of vCJD transmission by
> >
> > transplantation and the benefits to patients receiving a transplant,
> >
> > especially where tissues/organs are scarce and are required for
> >
> > (potentially) life-saving procedures.
> >
> > SEAC
> >
> > May 2005
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.seac.gov.uk/pdf/cjd.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> > TSS
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> > ####################
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> > Summary of SEAC discussion of vertebral column: age at which
> >
> > specified risk material
> >
> > SEAC 87. April 21st 2005
> >
> > The Food Standards Agency asked the UK Spongiform Encephalopathy
> >
> > Advisory Committee (SEAC) to review an assessment of the BSE
> >
> > exposure risk from vertebral column1. This risk assessment quantified
> >
> > the infectivity predicted to enter the human food chain over a year as a
> >
> > result of making vertebral column specified risk material (SRM) at the
> >
> > age of 12 months instead of 30 months.
> >
> > SEAC was content with the approach used and assumptions made in
> >
> > the risk assessment. The committee noted that some uncertainties
> >
> > remained with regard to the extent of the species barrier between cattle
> >
> > and human. Nevertheless, even using the most pessimistic assumption
> >
> > (ie. low species barrier), the overall conclusions would not be
> >
> > significantly altered. It was also noted that the assessment included a
> >
> > pessimistic assumption about the levels of infectivity entering the food
> >
> > chain from residual dorsal root ganglia associated with vertebral
> >
> > column.
> >
> > The committee considered that the human health risk from vertebral
> >
> > column in under thirty month cattle was now very small. The difference
> >
> > in risk from vertebral column as SRM at 12 as opposed to 30 months of
> >
> > age was negligible. It was noted that average risks were calculated for
> >
> > the entire UK population. The risks to any subpopulation consuming
> >
> > large amounts of UK beef on the had not been specifically considered.
> >
> > Data on specific groups who might consume significant amounts of beef
> >
> > on the bone were not available. Nevertheless, although exposure
> >
> > would be higher in any such group than assumed in the assessment, it
> >
> > was considered that the risk to this population group is still likely to
> be
> >
> > very small.
> >
> > 1 DNV Consulting (2005). Assessment of Risk from Under Thirty Month
> > Beef-on-the Bone: Report for
> >
> > the Food Standards Agency.
> >
> > In summary, the human health risk from vertebral column in under thirty
> >
> > month cattle is now very low, and the difference in risk from vertebral
> >
> > column as SRM from 30 months or 12 months is very small, verging on
> >
> > negligible, even for any subgroup of individuals who may consume
> >
> > much of the current supply of beef on the bone.
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.seac.gov.uk/pdf/arm-210405.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> > 26 May 2005 - Draft minutes from the 87th SEAC meeting held on 21st April
> > are now available
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.seac.gov.uk/papers/papers.htm
> >
> >
> >
> > TSS
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> > ####################
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> > Water Board finalizing stance
> > Moving animal research site recommended in long term
> >
> > By KEVIN DARST
> > KevinDarst@coloradoan.com
> >
> >
> > Moving a Colorado Division of Wildlife animal research facility away from
> > the city's raw water treatment plant is one of the long-term
> recommendations
> > the city's Water Board will examine today.
> >
> > A Water Board subcommittee said Wednesday there's no evidence that city
> > water is in danger because of the proximity of the research site, 4330 W.
> > LaPorte Ave., which is across the street from the water plant, but that it
> > makes sense to create a "buffer" around the treatment plant.
> >
> > "Do we really want sick animals of any kind around our water supply?"
> > subcommittee and Water Board member Gina Janette asked.
> >
> > At its outdoor facility, the DOW studies chronic wasting disease, a
> > brain-wasting disease in deer and elk. Sick and healthy animals -
> including
> > deer, elk, cattle and bighorn sheep - live in separate pens, and work at
> the
> > site has led to much of the current knowledge about the illness.
> >
> > Chronic wasting disease is related to bovine spongiform encephalopathy -
> > also called mad cow disease in cattle, scrapie in sheep and
> > Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
> >
> > The Water Board likely will decide today which recommendations to give to
> > the City Council.
> >
> > Two vocal residents, one from Boulder and one from Wellington, have
> > questioned whether it's safe to have the research facility next door to
> the
> > treatment plant, which produces drinking water for about 200,000 customers
> > in the Fort Collins area. They say the malformed proteins, called prions,
> > that cause chronic wasting disease and similar illnesses could blow from
> the
> > research site into open ponds at the treatment plant that supply a small
> > amount of water to city customers.
> >
> > Research done at the DOW facility indicates the disease can live in the
> > soil.
> >
> > Experts say the risk of infection is miniscule and that a species barrier
> > makes it unlikely that chronic wasting disease would jump from deer and
> elk
> > to humans.
> >
> > Colorado State University owns the land the research facility is on and
> > began its own animal research at the site in the mid-1960s. The water
> > treatment plant began operation in 1968.
> >
> > Short-term recommendations from the water subcommittee Wednesday included
> > continual evaluation of new chronic wasting disease research and
> > prion-monitoring technology. Prions currently can't be detected in water.
> >
> > The committee also recommended that the DOW use the best management
> > practices available to minimize the risk of prions escaping the research
> > site.
> >
> > The Larimer County Board of Health and the Colorado Department of Public
> > Health and Environment have said there is no evidence that the research
> site
> > threatens public health.
> >
> > Committee members said Wednesday that the city should pursue a buffer
> around
> > its treatment plant, regardless of chronic wasting disease concerns.
> >
> > "It's in the interest of the city that they move," said committee and
> Water
> > Board member Johannes Gessler, who also said the issue was not an
> "immediate
> > crisis."
> >
> >
> > Originally published May 26, 2005
> >
> >
> http://www.coloradoan.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050526/NEWS01/5052603
> > 21/1002
> >
> > > recommended in long term
> >
> >
> >
> > what's the rush, why not just expose everyone to this agent...TSS
> >
> >
> >
> > SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
> >
> > Draft minutes of the open session of the 87th meeting held on 21st April
> >
> > 2005
> >
> > At
> >
> > The Conference Centre
> >
> > Holiday Inn Bloomsbury
> >
> > Coram Street
> >
> > London
> >
> > WC1N 1HT
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > - 20 -
> >
> > 69. Dr Adkin added that it had been assumed that there was no
> >
> > degradation of prion protein during the assumed 3 week non-
> >
> > 2 Arnold M. and Wilesmith J.W. (2003) Modelling studies on BSE occurrence
> to
> > assist in the
> >
> > review of the over thirty months rule in Great Britain. Proc Roy Soc Lond
> B
> > 270, 2141-2145
> >
> > grazing period. Members considered that should TSE agents
> >
> > persist in soil, infectivity could accumulate over time. Dr Adkin
> >
> > indicated that the accumulation of infectivity over time was not
> >
> > addressed, as an exposure assessment had not been carried out.
> >
> > In order for such accumulation to occur TSE infectivity would have
> >
> > to be applied on multiple occasions to the same location, which
> >
> > may be unlikely. One study indicated there would be 98% decay of
> >
> > the agent over 3 years3. Dr Matthews observed that accumulation
> >
> > would be against a backdrop of decreasing TSE prevalence. Mr
> >
> > Wyllie added that Defra- and EU-funded research is being
> >
> > conducted to investigate the behaviour and degradation of TSE
> >
> > agents in soil.
> >
> > 70. A member considered that, since the TSE agent is a protein, it was
> >
> > likely to decay quickly due to the pH of, and bacteria present in,
> >
> > soil. However, a member pointed out good evidence suggesting
> >
> > that the Chronic Wasting Disease agent persisted in the
> >
> > environment. Dr Matthews informed members that a VLA project
> >
> > on infectivity in sheep exposed to the farm environment indicated
> >
> > that material on pasture is infectious for at least 2 months.
> >
> > Members agreed that in view of the resistance of PrPsc to
> >
> > degradation, evidence from CWD and the VLA studies, it was safer
> >
> > to assume survival of the agent in soil for a significant amount of
> >
> > time.
> >
> > 71. In response to members' questions about the field spreading of
> >
> > fertiliser, Alan Brewer (Defra) informed the committee that some
> >
> > dust can arise from the activity, both from the fertiliser distribution
> >
> > process (that depends on the type of spreading mechanism) and
> >
> > from tractor wheels kicking up soil in arable situations. But it was
> >
> > not possible to indicate whether there was any likelihood of dust
> >
> > particles containing fertiliser drifting onto adjoining fields. He
> >
> > added that it was recognised as good practice for farmers not to
> >
> > spread fertiliser into hedges and watercourses.
> >
> >
> >
> > snip...
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/draft87.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> > TSS
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> > ####################
> >
> >
> > hell, i went and did it again. sorry, i tend to overwhelm folks say.
> > the bay is slicker than all s***, the specs and flounder are out back, so
> am
> > i.....later...........TSS
> >
> > kindest Regards,
> > Terry
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xxxxxxxxx>
> > To: <flounder9@verizon.net>
> > Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 11:53 AM
> > Subject: Re: Fw: Found: BSE Research Expert
> >
> >
> > > Dear Terry:
> > >
> > > This just came in.
> > >
> > >
> > > I've laid the ground work for you to do what you do
> > > best.
> > >
> > > All the best,
> > >
> > > Burkie
> > > -----------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > >
> > > --- RM Thornsberry <xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > Mr. Burkholder,
> > > >
> > > > I am chairman of the BSE Committee for R-CALF. I am
> > > > looking for information
> > > > concerning a Japanese company developing a live
> > > > animal BSE test which was to
> > > > be available by summer of 2005.
> > > >
> > > > I would be very interested in visiting with the
> > > > gentleman you referr to.
> > > > R-CALF may be conducting a BSE Roundtable again this
> > > > summer. This gentleman
> > > > may want to be involved. If he allows, send me his
> > > > email address and I will
> > > > send him the Proceedings from the BSE Roundtable
> > > > that I put together in
> > > > December, 2003.
> > > >
> > > > Dr. Thornsberry
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > To: R. Max Thornsberry <xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 11:37 AM
> > > > Subject: FW: Found: BSE Research Expert
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > snip......end........tss
> > > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [xxxxxxxxxxxx]
> > > > > Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 9:26 PM
> > > > > To: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > Cc: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > Subject: Found: BSE Research Expert
> > > > >
> > > > > [Private to you three recipients]
> > > > >
> > > > > Dear xxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxxxx, and xxxxxxxxxxxx,
> > > > >
> > > > > I have gained the confidence of an individual who
> > > > > lives here in the States, who probably has done
> > > > the
> > > > > most independent catalogueing of BSE research that
> > > > > exists. He has done over seven years of
> > > > accumulating
> > > > > this information, and can supply so much stuff up
> > > > in a
> > > > > matter of a few minutes that it just plain boggles
> > > > my
> > > > > mind.
> > > > >
> > > > > He can site incidents, cases, USDA lies, UK
> > > > research,
> > > > > European research, at will.
> > > > >
> > > > > His mother died of vCJD....hence the impetus of
> > > > his
> > > > > personal interest and research.
> > > > >
> > > > > Just like myself and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > and
> > > > > this individual I am talking about, as we all
> > > > began
> > > > > studying things independently, it has become more
> > > > and
> > > > > more apparent that alot of the "so-called" science
> > > > > driving world BSE policy has been "a little bit
> > > > less
> > > > > than scientific, and much more developed to serve
> > > > > special interests," which continues to compromise
> > > > any
> > > > > policy in any country.
> > > > >
> > > > > I have talked personally to this person, find him
> > > > to
> > > > > be credible and very much opposed to USDA's flaws
> > > > and
> > > > > failures, regarding food safety, in general. He
> > > > is
> > > > > colorful and believeable.
> > > > >
> > > > > Now then, why I am I writing to tell you this?
> > > > >
> > > > > Well, I am just plain wondering, out loud, if
> > > > R-Calf
> > > > > would be willing to have him testify at these
> > > > > hearings.
> > > > >
> > > > > I have asked him if he would be willing to
> > > > testify.
> > > > > His answer is that he would.
> > > > >
> > > > > As with any "expert witness," he would be entitled
> > > > to
> > > > > some kind of compensation for his time and
> > > > research
> > > > > and testimony. Air fare, hotel accomodation,
> > > > food
> > > > > and remuneration for the testimony would seem to
> > > > be
> > > > > reasonable for such a witness.
> > > > >
> > > > > So, I guess my old commodity brokerage skills come
> > > > > into play, in that I am asking you folks, if a
> > > > person
> > > > > like this could be of use to the R-Calf cause?
> > > > >
> > > > > I am asking for your input and feedback.
> > > > >
> > > > > I do believe his testimony could be useful.
> > > > >
> > > > > What do you all think?
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Hope to hear back from you soon, either way. Yes
> > > > or
> > > > > no. Perhaps you can contact your folks at R-Calf
> > > > to
> > > > > see what they think, too.
> > > > >
> > > > > Best Regards,
> > > > >
> > > > >
snip......end..........tss



=====================================================
************************************************************************************
=====================================================



----- Original Message -----
From: "Will Miller" <@williammillergroup.com>
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@verizon.net>; <@edwardslawfirm.org>
Cc: <@fryelaw.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2006 3:40 PM
Subject: Re: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] SRMs and Non-Ambulatory disabled cattle[TSS]


> Dear. Mr. Singeltary,
>
> Thank you for passing along this new TSE science.
>
> Will Miller
>
>
> At 12:43 PM -0600 1/10/06, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote:
> >update on studies from japan.....tss
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
snip.......end..........tss

=====================================
**********************************************************
=====================================


oh what tangled webs we weave, when all we do is practice to deceive. ...TSS





[quote="flounder"]PART 2
quote]